Notions such as 'guilt' and 'forgiveness' can be defined in objective terms, but more normally have an emotional dimension that cannot be experienced by institutions -but perhaps some analogs to these emotions can be discerned in the behaviour of states? In the 1990s the Western powers were engaged in dealing with a sequence of crises which appeared to call for some kind of intervention - Bosnia 1991/95, Somalia 1992/3, Haiti, 1993/4, Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1998and this essay explores the extent to which it can be said that action/inaction in one case can be related back to moral judgements of behaviour in earlier cases.
Introduction
As previous papers drawn from the series of workshops and panels sponsored by the Ethics, Institutions and International Relations Network have demonstrated, discussion of moral agency in relation to bodies such as states, intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations, business enterprises and the like presents real difficulties, but when the focus shifts to the notion of a 'delinquent' institution things become even more complicated.
1 Notions such as 'delinquency', 'blame' and, by extension, 'forgiveness' and 'guilt' engage the emotions as well as the intellect, and although the strict separation between reason and the emotions characteristic of a great deal of contemporary moral theory is now being challenged, partly in response to the revival of interest in the moral world of the Classical Greeks, there are genuine problems posed by this conjuncture. 2 When the agency of human individuals is in question the emotions and the intellect cannot be understood as wholly separate, but when the agency of institutions is at stake qualitatively different and more difficult problems are posed.
Notions of 'forgiveness' and 'guilt' are not necessarily emotionally laden. Still, although it might be possible to think of the notion of 'forgiving' unemotionally -for example, we speak of 'forgiving a debt' as synonymous with writing it off -generally to say that we have forgiven somebody, or have been forgiven by somebody, suggests a change in emotional states. Similarly, we might think of 'guilt' as something that can be assessed dispassionately, for example by the verdict of a court, but guilt is also a state of mind, something that we feel (or do not feel). We may be found guilty of a criminal offence without actually feeling guilty (because we did not do it, or because we do not think 'it' should be a crime), and vice versa. Guilt can also be 'existential' in the sense that we may feel guilty about situations over which we have no control and for which we are not in any meaningful sense responsible; the approach to issues such as world poverty by cosmopolitan international political theorists and anti-globalization activists illustrates the point here.
'We' in these sentence can be taken to signify private individuals, but some legal systems allow corporations to be held criminally responsible for their actions, and here the problem is posed more starkly. It is certainly possible for such a delinquent institution to be found guilty of, say, corporate manslaughter (assuming such a crime is on the statute book), but whether a corporation can feel guilt is another matter -and What began as a legal formality and a judgement on the foreign policy of the Wilhelmite
Reich, was translated in the minds of the German people (and some of their former enemies) into a an assertion of the collective guilt of all Germans, with serious consequence for post-war politics. Some figures in the Social Democratic Party anticipated these consequences and tried to divert the resentment of Germans towards the regime of Kaiser Wilhelm II, but without much success -however one might rationally defend Article 231, the emotional damage had been done and it simply did not prove possible to separate state, people and regime.
5
In short, the problem this dual nature of notions such as 'guilt' and 'forgiveness' poses is easy to see. While it is certainly possible to argue that institutions possess agency, and thus it is only a relatively small step to suggest that they can possess moral agency, the idea that institutions are capable of an emotional response is much more problematic -individuals who represent institutions are certainly so capable, but the relationship between these warm bodies and the institutions they represent is complex Certainly, he held the constitutional position of head of government but, perhaps significantly, he was not head of state; it is normally the occupant of the latter rolewhich is seen as in some sense beyond partisan politics, rather than the former, which is necessarily political in a partisan sense -who is taken to represent the nation as a whole.
8
As head of government Brandt was entitled to act as he did and the fact that, according to one poll, 48% of Germans thought his gesture 'exaggerated', as opposed to 41% who thought it 'appropriate' is, in politico-legal terms, beside the point. 9 But it is not at all clear that this is beside the point when we look at the emotional dimension of his act, which implied that he was representing Germany in a much more than constitutional sense. The German Chancellor was not simply expressing remorse and asking for forgiveness on behalf of his government, but on behalf of 'Germany', the German nation and the German people.
Interesting and significant in this context was Brandt's personal history. As a young SPD militant he had gone into exile during the Nazi years, and -as the more unscrupulous of his opponents never allowed the German people to forget -had returned precisely because of the distance that existed between him and them; his innocence allowed him to represent their guilt. The fact that personally he had nothing to apologise for emphasised the 'national' quality of his gesture. As an aside, the furore over Gunter
Grass's recent admission that he served in the Waffen SS in the war makes a similar point in a different way -Grass's standing as someone who has always been keen to accuse others of whitewashing the national past has been seriously damaged by the realisation that he hid his own guilty secrets. As with Schmidt, he (probably) did nothing criminal in the war years but he must have believed, and probably rightly, that had he told the truth about his wartime experiences, his castigations of others for their Nazi past would have been perceived as tainted, hence the deception. To act as the conscience of the post-war nation he needed to have clean hands.
respect to their previous actions or inactions. Is the notion of a guilty conscience appropriate here? Intuitively, it is not wholly implausible to think that, say, the willingness of Western leaders to go (almost) all the way in Kosovo in 1999 was partly shaped by a realisation that in earlier crises in the 1990s -in particular, in former
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda -they or their predecessors had failed to rise to the moral seriousness of the problem. Perhaps a guilty conscience led to a desire to make amends?
But intuition is not always a reliable guide in such matters When we look at the history of this period things become very complex, and the kind of purity discernable in Brandt's gesture is hard to find. It seems that, for the leading actor, the US, there were two narratives of guilt in play in the 1990s, which sometimes interacted to cancel each other out.
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Bill Clinton, Somalia, the Rwanda Genocide and the Wars of Former Yugoslavia
If there is one event in the 1990s that ought to have generated guilt and remorse, it is the failure of those in a position to act to do anything substantive to prevent, or curtail, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and so this is a reasonable starting point for a discussion, although, as will be noted below, it is not actually the beginning of at least some of the relevant narratives. Equally, it makes sense to start this story with the US reading of these events, not because the US necessarily bears the most guilt for the genocide, but because it -and its leaders -have been more introspective about issues of guilt and innocence than most of the other parties involved. Samantha Power tells us that when President Clinton read Philip Gourevich's New Yorker articles on the Rwanda genocide, he sent copies to aides annotated with comments such as 'Is what he's saying true?' and 'How did this happen?'. 13 Power describes Clinton's outrage as 'oddly timed' since he showed no interest in the issue in 1994, but she also acknowledges that the genocide never got near the top of the list of things with which the President was concerned on a daily basis, and that there was never a full-scale staff conference on the subject, which 12 Brandt was also contributing to two narratives, an overt external narrative concerning Germany's relationship to its past victims, and a more tacit narrative about what it meant to be a German in 1970. but, as will become apparent, this is not really a parallel to the events of the 1990s. suggests it is not implausible that he genuinely did not have a clear sense as to what was going on. Moreover, the horrific nature of the things that were happening in Rwanda were such that even those better informed than the President found it difficult to believe that reports from that country were not exaggerated, especially when those who were in a good position to know the true state of affairs, in particular the French, supported this thesis, arguing that both sides in a civil war were responsible for atrocities. 14 This, incidentally, is an argument that was repeatedly used in Bosnia as well; but the fact that both sides in a civil conflict are usually implicated in some kind of atrocity ought not to prevent us from recognising significant moral differences -the RPF in Rwanda never intended genocide, the Rwanda government and armed forces did; the Government of Bosnia did not support ethnic cleansing as a matter of principle, its Serb opponents, supported by Belgrade, did. Returning to Rwanda, even today it is emotionally difficult to accept the truth of reports of terrible events that, with our intellect, we know happened.
In any event, Clinton clearly felt the need to make amends in some way.
Unfortunately the method chosen did not exactly help those who would make excuses for his earlier inaction. an earlier generation, and with a view to preparing the way for policy shifts in the future, Clinton in 1994 was already embedded in another kind of narrative, one not entirely of 16 Also, it should be acknowledged that the Rwandan Government were less upset by the terms of his apology that were Clinton's domestic critics; President Paul Kagame's speech on the tenth anniversary of the genocide is instructive here. He accepted the apologies of the British, Belgians and Americans as a sign of their basic decency, while attacking the French, accusing them (accurately enough) of having financed and underwritten the genocide, and of refusing to acknowledge this fact, which led to a walk-out by the French Ambassador to Kigali. http://www.gov.rw/government/president/speeches/2004/07_04_04_genocide_speech.html 17 In 1994 it was widely believed that describing what was happening as a genocide would mandate action -hence the many evasions ('acts of genocide' and so on). But Darfur has been described as a genocide by the US and other state actors, and, sadly, nothing has followed from this example of truth-telling. 18 I stress again that I ask this question not in order to suggest that the US was the most guilty state in the 1990s, but for the very different reason that the US leadership was the most introspective and thus opened themselves up to an enquiry of this kind.
his own making, where more recent and immediate events bore down upon him. If failure to act in 1994 constituted delinquency and generated guilt and a desire for forgiveness, this failure in turn can be partially explained in the context of guilt associated with an earlier failure, but this time a failure of commission rather than omission.
And here yet another complication muddies the water. German guilt over its Nazi past focused on atrocities committed by Germans, but the guilty conscience experienced by US decision-makers over the Somalia debacle was not usually related to the failed intervention itself, and the fact that the Somali people were abandoned to anarchy, but to a side-effect of this failure, the loss of the lives of American soldiers, and in particular the 18 lives lost in the infamous 'Black Hawk Down' incident on 3 October 1993. The loss of life here was obviously not on a very great scale, but there seems no reason to doubt that it had quite a considerable effect on the political, if not the military, leadership of the US. The Pentagon saw this abortive mission as confirmation of their scepticism about the whole enterprise ('we do deserts, we don't do cities' was Colin Powell's mantra when Chair of the Joint Chiefs) but were perhaps better equipped to place the loss of life in perspective than the predominantly civilian group who surrounded President Clinton, most of whom, like their leader, had avoided military service and had genuine qualms at putting their fellow-citizen's lives at risk. In this case putative US 'delinquency' was not (solely) related to its international obligations but to its responsibilities towards its own citizens/soldiers whom it had, allegedly, let down by placing them in harm's way without sufficient reason or a clear enough sense of mission . In short, we have here a second narrative of delinquency which privileges US citizens as the referent object, as opposed to privileging the international common good, as is the case with narratives that focus the Genocide Convention. saw in Bosnia. There, several hundred thousand people had been killed. In Kosovo the current toll was several hundred. For most it was not too late, but we had to summon our resolve." 27 That such resolve was summoned was largely due to Albright -with an assist from Milosevic himself, and, in a different way, from Tony Blair as will be discussed below -and what became to some known as 'Madeleine's War' was a tribute to her persistence and recognition of what was important. Perhaps in this case an element of moral as well as political learning can be discerned, and certainly her emotions, her moral sentiments, seem to have been engaged, as well as her critical faculties. The reader will, however, note that this is, again, a case of an individual's emotions being engaged and the extent to which the institution which she represents can be said to be expressing these feelings is highly debateable, especially since she, unlike Willy Brandt, was not head of government, much less head of state.
Tony Blair, Bosnia and Kosovo
In American narratives of the 1990s, the British are, for the most part, cast as bit-players on the world scene. This is broadly accurate, which is why this essay has focused on the should not do the right thing now seems perverse.
Conclusion
Where have these reflections taken us? Not very far perhaps, although there are a few tentative generalisations that can be made. First, while scholars after the event will focus on some particular issue such as US policy towards the Rwanda genocide, at the time this was only one of a great many issues on which Clinton was being briefed by his staff;
perhaps it should have been highlighted, and occasionally an issue will indeed force all others off the President's (or Prime Minister's) agenda, but most of the time the unceasing flow of events does not allow the top decision-makers to focus long enough on any particular subject to engage in deep introspection. The inability to grasp this point, or to understand its significance, is one of the reason why academic and journalistic accounts after the event are so frequently critical of the moral sense of decision-makers.
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Second, and even taking the time factor into account, it is pretty clear that notions such as blame and forgiveness actually played very little part in the way politicians thought about humanitarian issues in the 1990s. They may have sometimes thought of other states as 'delinquent institutions' but rarely their own; only rarely did they, ask for or give, forgiveness and although they sometimes blamed others, they rarely blamed themselves. There is no equivalent in this period to the grand gesture of Willy Brandt in 1970 -the closest we come to this is the suggestion that in 1999 Tony Blair was, by his 33 Actually, contrary to popular belief, the US did not give aid to Bin Laden, and the assistance to Saddam in the 1980s was mostly confined to sharing satellite intelligence -his actual war machine was made up of Russian and French arms, as an examination of the debris on the battlefield confirms -but the point stands.
34 Popular fiction makes the same mistake. In the, generally very instructive. But, third, it would be a mistake to suggest that politicians and diplomats do not learn from the past, and sometimes the things they learn are moral lessons to accompany the political wisdom that reflecting on past errors may bring. Madeleine Albright's memoirs are, perhaps, an example of this, and provide an interesting contrast with Douglas Hurd's. 35 Predictably neither Hurd nor Albright makes a big issue about the mistakes they made -memoirs are usually apologias rather than self-indictments -but it is in the nuances that differences can be found. Hurd seems to have come out of his time in office with much the same set of ideas that he went in with, and he clearly still does not understand why so many people still feel upset by the policies he pursued in Bosnia;
Albright, one feels, developed and matured in office and, importantly, this maturing did not involve suppressing her obvious emotional responses to some of the crises she was forced to deal with. At times this probably made her an uncomfortable person to work with, and might even have contributed to mistakes, but if we are seriously concerned with the moral responsibilities of institutions -as we should be -then sometimes an emotional response is the right response. imagination could he be seen as personally responsible for these misdeeds. There may be a significant point of political psychology at work here; it is one thing to identify, regret and attempt to rectify one's country's past mistakes, but it is another thing altogether when the mistakes in question are one's own. Moreover, the notion of a repentant politician expiating past guilt by current action is not one that seems to be accepted by the public at large. Perhaps, paradoxically, it is only the innocent -those who are detached from an earlier period of delinquency -who can handle guilt and allow it to affect their behaviour?
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